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Abstract— Provision of security involves protecting lives and 
properties, and properties in this context include data and 
services. This paper investigates the impact of cyber-attacks on 
load scheduling applications by simulating various possible 
modes for these attacks while observing possible effects on the 
users.  The attack modes used are in the form of denial of service 
(DoS) and phishing attacks whereby the attacker is able to 
interfere with data intake to the Home Energy Management 
Systems (HEMS) or a modification of critical data to the HEMS. 
The dynamic pricing information and load profile data is the 
target here although other types of data utilized by the central 
controller for load scheduling purposes can also be targeted. The 
test-bed uses load scheduling applications based on genetic 
algorithm optimization. Results show the impact on optimized 
load profiles and how they can discourage active demand 
response participation if such attacks are not properly managed. 
Index Terms-- Cybersecurity, Demand Response, Dynamic 
Pricing, Home Automation and Optimization 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cyber-attack is a familiar experience to internet users 
since the commercialization of internet services and 
operations. As in the real world, similar criminal activities are 
carried out by people who have capitalized on the 
vulnerability of data transferred over the internet for their 
own selfish needs. The realization that information 
transferred via the internet can be hacked, harvested and 
compromised, has offered intruders alternative ways to 
invading peoples’ privacy without having to physically step 
into their premises. As a result, evolution of traditional power 
grid network system to a smart grid network which primarily 
utilizes communication and data transfer infrastructure, 
requires adequate security in order to deter intruders from 
disrupting the network.  
The focus of this paper is on consumer side of the smart 
grid within a liberalized energy market, in particular on the 
emerging Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) that 
may be linked to other external entities such as Virtual Power 
Plants, Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) and micro-
grid operators in order to provide for load balancing services, 
renewable energy integration and ultimately financial benefit 
to the consumer. Although a survey by promotional 
marketing firm Parago, suggests that only about 14% of 
consumers in the US currently participate in demand response 
programs, security of the HEMS still remains important [1]. 
Several factors can encourage cyber-criminals to consider 
hacking into people’s privacy but the commonest reasons 
seem to be just for fun, intending to prove a point that they 
can hack a new system or simply because they just want to 
bring down an organized system [2]. Sometimes information 
harvested from unsuspecting victims are sold to a third party 
for some monetary value, and this is one of the occasions 
whereby cyber-criminals trade directly the personal details of 
online users in the so called “dark web” [3]. This therefore 
leaves the energy grid itself as a matter of national security if 
it becomes subject to attack.  
The aim of the work is to demonstrate the possible impacts 
on the performance of a load scheduler which came under 
specific and successful cyber-attack on the HEMS. As a 
result, appropriate proactive defense mechanism can be 
provided which is capable of preventing the effectiveness of 
any such attack. Although authentication, firewalls, antivirus 
and other conventional protective mechanisms are absolutely 
necessary, it is also important to incorporate other protective 
mechanisms which act as the last line of defense in securing 
the HEMS. This is incorporated in the algorithm that runs the 
program such that required actions can be taken. 
II. RELATED WORK 
On December 23 2015, there was a recorded incidence of 
cyber-attack on the Ukrainian reginal electricity distribution 
company whereby seven 110kV and twenty three 35 kV 
substations were disconnected for three hours [4]. This attack 
was attributed to foreign government-sponsored cyber-
criminals who remotely controlled the SCADA and caused 
blackout on approximately 225,000 customers. This shows an 
example of the numerous threats which cyber criminals 
oftentimes, pose to the smart grid network and the disturbing 
disadvantages of being all connected via the internet. In 
trying to understand how to identify cyber-attack patterns and 
preventing their occurrence, several authors have contributed 
through several experiments to this effect.  
Authors in [5] investigated the attack vectors on smart 
HEMS analyzed on a digitalSTORM installation using 
solution-based analysis. This was done by identifying and 
ranking possible attack vectors or entry points into a smart 
home systems with suggested ways of thwarting such attacks. 
Those entry points included: the server, communication bus, 
smart control device (e.g. smartphone or control station) and 
remote third party services which provides monitoring and 
control services. A malicious app was surreptitiously installed 
on the home owner’s android smart-phone and was used as 
entry vector which can turn appliances ON or OFF.  Results 
shows various vulnerabilities via the attack entry points on 
the HEMS while suggesting authentication from authorized 
users as a reliable means of preventing such attacks.  
Authors in [6] improved mesh network security used 
within various smart grid domains against cyber-attack by 
introducing a dynamically updating key distribution strategy 
on network protocols. The proposed method was mainly 
designed against DoS attack by utilizing a 4-way Merkle-tree 
based handshaking scheme. The reliability of the model was 
verified using Proverif and they were able to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of key refreshment strategy in thwarting DoS 
attack on the smart grid network. 
Authors in [7] [8] proposed means of detecting cyber-
attacks in HEMS by alterations on the load profiles.  Two 
models of attacks were considered which includes: Dynamic 
Load Altering Attacks (D-LAA) and Static Load Altering 
Attacks (S-LAA). D-LAA was considered because the 
possibility to control loads dynamically implies also, the 
possibility to attack loads dynamically. S-LAA is more 
common and is based on changing the volume of certain 
vulnerable loads, usually in an abrupt fashion. The paper 
suggested possible D-LAAs detection by applying frequency 
domain analysis of the load profile using Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) of the original load profiles [9] via spectral 
analysis. Another technique includes Real-time detection in 
frequency domain using Windowed-FFT (W-FFT), and 
detection based on both load and frequency signals [10]. 
Several other forms of cyber-attack are possible and may 
include communication system failure which could originate 
from the utility or from the localized HEMS [11]. The next 
section is a description of the method applied in analyzing 
possible attacks within the HEMS and suggested ways of 
preventing possible impacts on the load profile generated.  
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
The impact of security breaches on homes that engage 
actively in demand response programs can be investigated by 
modeling possible attack scenarios which may affect the 
home network in order to analyze possible impacts due to 
these attacks. Unsecured or poorly secured communication 
links within the household are usually the target and the focus 
here is on communication links that send pricing information 
from the retailer to the HEMS. Each model of the various 
possible cyber-attacks is simulated in order to investigate the 
impact on the localized scheduler. Pricing is an important 
variable but also vulnerable due to energy cost savings 
capabilities thereby making them an attacker’s target [12] 
In this analysis, a household whose occupants are active 
demand response (DR) participants are presumed to receive a 
forecast load schedule of which they are prepared to abide 
with. Thereafter, an attack on the pricing data was 
encountered which affected the components of the objective 
function that has price information as a variable. The 
objective function is given as the following equation: 
 
Fj,i = wa*∑Aj,i + wb*∑Bj,i + wc*∑Cj,i - wd*∑Dj,i    (1) 
Where:  
    A (Impact on Occupants) = Change in Energy (∆ℰ) * Occupancy 
B (Cost) = Optimized Load (𝑥) * Dynamic Pricing (α) 
C (Discomfort) = ∆ℰ / Standard deviation of Load Profiles (σ) 
D (Optimization Factor) = Optimized Load (𝑥)/ Forecast Load (e) 
e = Forecasted load profile. 
i = Iteration number 
j = hourly time interval in a day. 
w = Weighting factor 
𝑥 = randomly generated load profile for optimization. 
 
Here, A represents the effect of absolute change in energy 
use on all occupants. However when nobody is in house, the 
change has no effect. This is why ∆ℰ is multiplied by the 
occupancy to give A, which offers a better measure than ∆ℰ. A 
low impact of such change is favorable to the consumer.  
B represents change that effects energy cost reduction. 
Cost is a major incentive to the adoption of demand response 
programs, hence its inclusion on the fitness function equation.  
C represents the discomfort experienced due to scheduling 
which is expected to be minimized in order to reduce drastic 
reassignments of loads from the original forecasted load 
profile to other times for the new day.  
D represents optimization factor which attempts to scale 
the optimized load to the magnitude of the forecast load 
profile at every iteration during optimization. A high effect of 
this application is considered favorable to the consumer.  
Various scenarios are therefore simulated in the next 
section by nullifying or modifying the affected variable with 
respect to the attack. Hence, impact of the respective cyber-
attack on the forecast scheduled load profile is observed.  
A. Genetic Algorithm-Based Model 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) is the optimization tool used 
mainly due to the ease in appending variables to the fitness 
function in order to accommodate any desired objective. Due 
to the dissimilarities of the variables in Eqn.1, each variable 
is converted to the per unit scale in order to allow additions of 
the variables while the weightings places more emphasis on 
any variable considered more important that the other. Eqn.2 
and Eqn.3 shows the constraints applied whereby Eqn.2 is an 
energy limitation equation, and the maximum and minimum 
energy level of every randomly-generated load profile sample 
remains within the limit of the forecasted load profile. 
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥                       (2)                               
On the other hand, Eqn. 3 is an energy conservation 
equation whereby the total energy of each randomly-
generated load profiles samples is equal to the total energy 
consumed in any given day.  
 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑗
24
𝑗=1
= ∑ 𝑒𝑗
24
𝑗=1
                                  (3) 
Eqn. 1 is a minimization of the fitness function. This 
means that the variables with positive signs are minimized 
while those with negative signs are maximized.  
B. Cyber-Attack Models and Impact on HEMS  
I. Denial of Service Attack 
A typical DoS attack can be initiated when an attacker 
deliberately generates multiple requests from his device to a 
target via a single protocol, thereby causing an impediment 
on data traffic and preventing the target from accessing their 
data online. Alternatively, the attacker can generate multiple 
requests through some master to slave computers while 
pretending to be the victim computer. The slave computers 
not recognizing the source of the request command presumes 
that all requests came from the victim computer and in an 
attempt to respond to those requests, they end up causing an 
unprecedented traffic and delays on the victim computer. 
Such requests are usually massive for the server to withstand 
and this type of attack is known as Distributed DoS (DDoS). 
 
Fig. 2: Distributed Denial of Service Attack on a Victim [13] 
Any such attack on the pricing information as shown in 
Fig. 2 is capable of preventing the load scheduling algorithm 
from accessing the pricing data required for load scheduling. 
The consequence of this attack is the non-availability of the 
pricing function to the fitness function of Eqn. 1. 
Mathematically, given the cost B, as a variable of the fitness 
function F, total Energy Cost per day is given as: 
BTotal = wb*α* ∑ 𝑥 j,i                                                    (4) 
For a DoS attack, Price = nil (data is delayed or unavailable) 
Then from Eqn. 4, 
Total Energy Cost per day = wb*0* ∑ 𝑥 j,i 
Therefore for a DoS attack, Eqn. 1 becomes: 
Fj,i = wa*∑Aj,i + 0 + wc*∑Cj,i - wd*∑Dj,i                     (5)  
II. Constant- Pricing Attack  
Reducing a dynamic pricing regime to a fixed pricing 
signal can be a consequence of an unsecured network 
hijacked by a cyber-attacker. In order to model this attack; 
Let Constant Price factor = Ύ,  
Then from Eqn. 4, total Energy Cost per day = wb* Ύ *∑ 𝑥 j,i 
Therefore for a fixed pricing attack, Eqn. 1 becomes:  
Fj,i = wa*∑Aj,i + wb* Ύ* ∑ 𝑥 j,i + wc*∑Cj,i - wd*∑Dj,i                  (6)                                                                        
III. False Data Injection Attack  
    A cyber-attack on the dynamic pricing information can 
occur in form of false data injected on the actual pricing 
signal. The aim of this sort of attack can be to cause the 
generation of random and unpredictable results thereby 
presenting a scheduled load which is not a true reflection of 
the market events. The result is important because this type of 
attack can be difficult to detect since different types of results 
can be generated each time the algorithm is run. 
 
Fig. 3: False data Injection Attack on Actual Price Signal 
Let us consider an attack scenario whereby the actual 
dynamic price signal α is injected with some discrete 
randomly generated false data ɳ to create distortion thereby 
creating a new price profile R as represented in Fig. 3. The 
new price profile R over a 24 hour interval is as given in 
Eqn.7. 
Rj = ∑ α𝑗 + ɳ𝑗
24
𝑗=1
                                 (𝟕)
A variation of false data levels introduced is evaluated and 
a maximum false data level of up to 20% of the peak dynamic 
price value is assumed. Therefore Rj is bound by a maximum 
allowable proportion of the actual pricing signal for only 
positive pricing values. This is as given in Eqn.8. 
αmin ≤  Rj ≤ 1.2αmax                           (8) 
The actual day-ahead pricing data was obtained from [14] 
and 20 iterations of increasing false data level was 
incremented in a step-wise manner from 0 up till 20% of the 
maximum price value. In order to model this attack, Let 
Noisy Price =Rj .  
Then from Eqn. 4, total Energy Cost per day = wb * Rj *∑ 𝑥 j,i 
Therefore for a fixed pricing attack, Eqn. 1 becomes:  
Fj,i = wa*∑Aj,i + wb* Rj* ∑ 𝑥 j,i + wc*∑Cj,i - wd*∑Dj,i           (9)   
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS  
In order to perform load scheduling, the controlled 
variable is given as the Forecast Load Profile obtained from 
[15] while the three principal input data used as controlling 
variables include: Price Profile, Standard Deviation of Load 
Profile and Occupancy.  
 
Fig. 5: Principal Input Variables for Load Scheduling 
The output is the Optimized Load Profile generated due to 
the effect of the controlling variables shown in Fig. 5. The 
results of the three attack scenarios are presented as well as 
means of mitigating each of the attacks encountered. 
Case 1. Impact of DOS Attack 
Here, Eqn. 5 is applied whereby the price data is not 
available for load scheduling optimization due to DOS attack. 
From Fig. 6, four events were carried out which includes: load 
profile with attack on price; load profile with actual day-ahead 
price; load profile with forecast load profile (generated 
locally) and load profile without scheduling (which acts as a 
control).It is observable that the optimized load profile during 
attack re-traces the forecast load profile. This is because when 
pricing information is not available the optimized load profile 
retains approximately same profile as the original forecast 
load profile. In other words, such an attack will render the 
scheduling operation temporarily dormant and ineffective. 
 
Fig. 6: DOS Impact on Load Profile and Possible Correction 
A reliable solution for this attack is to locally generate price 
forecast which uses historical prices to estimate the day-ahead 
price, if the use of previous day’s data is not acceptable. This 
outcome is also demonstrated in Fig.6 and it is impressive to 
observe how much of a good job the forecasted price did in 
providing a price profile that can be used as an approximate 
data to substitute a DOS attack on a pricing data.  
Case 2. Impact of Constant-Pricing Attack 
Here, Eqn. 6 is applied by replacing the dynamic pricing 
model with a fixed pricing system for different fixed pricing 
levels. This is as shown in Fig. 7a-c whereby the higher in 
magnitude of the fixed pricing value, the greater the deviation 
of the optimized load profile from the forecast load profile. If 
the constant pricing line goes below the minimum day-ahead 
price which is $0.02125/kWh in this illustration, the 
optimized load profile becomes almost indistinguishable from 
the forecast load profile. If the fixed pricing value becomes 
zero, DOS attack as shown in Fig. 6 becomes replicated.  
   
Fig. 7a: Scheduled Load Profile for high Constant Price 
  
Fig. 7b: Scheduled Load Profile for Medium Constant Price 
  
Fig. 7c: Scheduled Load Profile for low Constant Price 
This type of attack is considered to be relatively easy to 
detect especially because constant-valued pricing data is an 
anomaly in a dynamic pricing system hence, the HEMS can 
easily flag such as an error. It is therefore possible for the 
HEMS to find ways to nullifying its impact by requesting for 
a second update on the pricing information or by relying on a 
localized forecasting mechanism as discussed in Case 1. 
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Case 3. Impact of False data-Injection Attack 
This attack is modelled using Eqn. 9 and the impact on the 
optimized load profile is examined assuming the pricing data 
contains some randomly generated false data As this is 
gradually introduced to the price variable, the scheduled load 
responds in different ways. The graphs in Fig.9a-c represent 
the graphs of load schedules at some selected proportions of 
price and increasing false data signal combinations from a 
total of 20 samples. The optimized load profile in Fig.9a 
shows a greater deviation from the forecast load profile, 
unlike in Fig.9b and Fig.9c which shows lesser deviations. 
There is zero false data content in the pricing data according 
to Fig.9a whereas in Fig.9b and Fig.9c, the false data content 
is at 10% and 20% of the maximum price value respectively. 
This information is very important here because it shows that 
there is a significant difference between the optimized load 
profiles in Fig.9a and Fig.9b, but little or no difference 
between Fig.9b and Fig.9c. Hence, introducing false data can 
quickly degenerate the output almost instantaneously.  
  
Fig 9a: Load Schedule for High 0 % false data content 
  
Fig 9b: Load Schedule for Medium 10 % false data content 
  
Fig 9c: Load Schedule for Low 20 % false data content 
However, it is observable that there is always positive 
savings obtainable for any given false data injection on the 
price. This is due to the optimization program that tends to 
follow the cheapest possible cost for any given input hence, it 
will be difficult for the optimizer to detect them early enough.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The optimization constraints are observed to play key roles 
in ensuring that the optimized load stayed within certain 
boundaries of the forecast load profile irrespective of the type 
of attack on the scheduler. This offers a great relief since the 
impact of such attacks on the household and the grid can be 
localized and the possibility of causing all the appliances in a 
household to turn ON at the same time can be suppressed.  
The metering system is a possible means to detecting 
anomalies in view of the availability of the historical load 
consumption stored in the HEMS. So if strange scheduling 
pattern is generated, the system could call for a reassessment 
of all the input data. This is a good step towards effective 
error detection which will in turn create the avenue to seek 
the best solution depending on the type of attack involved. 
In conclusion, every attack will produce results but with 
reduced savings and customer satisfaction. This may lead to 
reduced user engagement in demand response programs but 
with improved security, advancement of the grid is assured. 
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